Parliament, the Pandemic, and Constitutional Principle in the United Kingdom: A Study of the Coronavirus Act 2020.

Constitutions come under pressure during emergencies and, as is increasingly clear, during pandemics. Taking the legislative and post-legislative debates in Westminster and the Devolved Legislatures on the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CVA) as its focus, this paper explores the robustness of parliamentary accountability during the pandemic, and finds it lacking. It suggests that this is attributable not to the situation of emergency per se, but to (a) executive decisions that have limited Parliament's capacity to scrutinise; (b) MPs' failure to maximise the opportunities for scrutiny that did exist; and (c) the limited nature of Legislative Consent Motions (LCMs) as a mode of holding the central government to account. While at first glance the CVA appears to confirm the view that in emergencies law empowers the executive and reduces its accountability, rendering legal constraints near-futile, our analysis suggests that this ought to be understood as a product, to a significant extent, of constitutional actors' mindset vis-à-vis accountability.

Parliament's One-Year Review of the Coronavirus Act 2020: Another Example of Parliament's Marginalisation in the Covid-19 Pandemic.

In this article, we consider the one-year review (OYR) by Parliament of temporary powers in the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CVA). The OYR stands as a key concession on the part of the UK government to enable scrutiny of Covid-19 law making, after the CVA was rushed through Parliament at the beginning of the pandemic. The principal argument of this article is that despite appearances, this review was another example of Parliament being marginalised during the Covid-19 pandemic. In particular, there were four obstacles to meaningful scrutiny in the OYR: inadequate parliamentary time scheduled for the review; the 'all-or-nothing' framing of the review; late and inaccurate government reporting prior to the OYR; and the failure to address key issues regarding the operation of the CVA, including major human rights concerns. In light of such obstruction to scrutiny, it is clear that the review represents a broken promise on the part of the current government to Parliament. The review is also part of a broader pattern of marginalising Parliament during the pandemic. In presenting this analysis, we argue that two changes could be made in the upcoming and penultimate review of the CVA in September 2021, in order to enable Parliament to engage in meaningful scrutiny in this review.